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Democracy by Delegation? Who Represents Whom and How in European 
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The democratic legitimacy of European governance is often said to rest on its ‘output’. 
However, such arguments also make the implicit ‘input’ claim that the Community 
Method and New Modes of Governance offer a more participatory and deliberative style 
of democratic politics, that are best suited to ‘represent’ the European interest. We test 
such claims by analysing them from three different perspectives: functional, societal and 
delegative. We conclude that they are grounded on a ‘substantive’ conception of 
representation, in which the agents of European governance ‘stand’ or ‘act’ for the 
European public. However, such claims are empty without formal processes of 
authorisation and accountability that ensure European governance effectively promotes 
the democratic values of political equality and responsiveness. 
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Since at least Maastricht, the EU has been in search of novel mechanisms and arguments 
to ground its democratic legitimacy. An increasingly influential view, which came to 
prominence with the debate following the Commission’s ‘White Paper on Governance’,2 
holds that the European Union has evolved new modes of governance (NMG) that either 
compensate for its lack of democratic legitimacy, or offer more participatory and 
deliberative styles of democratic politics than the traditional electoral and representative 
forms of democracy associated with the nation state. This view involves two distinct but 
interrelated arguments. On the one hand, the policy problems dealt with at the European 
level are said to be mainly regulatory, rather than redistributive, and so can be more 
 2 
appropriately handled by the ‘delegation’ of powers to specialized, and largely expert (or 
at least, non-majoritarian) institutions.
3
 On the other hand, the associated NMG involve 
innovative, less hierarchical, and soft-law based decision-making processes, that 
purportedly widen democratic involvement at various levels.
4
 Some commentators even 
argue they form part of an emergent and experimental architecture of governance, whose 
principles, though mainly instantiated through informal channels and practices, reflect 
those underpinning democracy more generally.
5
  
Both these arguments are usually presented in terms of their ability to secure 
democratic ‘outputs’ notwithstanding – and possibly because of – their lack of 
conventional democratic ‘input.’6 Nevertheless, these ‘output’ arguments invoke implicit 
claims to satisfy certain ‘input’ criteria for democratic legitimacy, albeit in 
unconventional ways. These claims rest on delegated bodies and NMG supposedly 
providing the means to ‘represent’ social actors, general interests or even an overarching 
‘European interest’ that the conventional democratic channels of political parties, 
electoral majorities and parliamentary representatives fail to register. As we shall show, 
their alleged superiority in achieving better democratic `outputs’ largely assume these 
representative ‘inputs’.  
 We start by outlining the nature of European governance and the role that 
delegation and NMG play in it. We then assess the representative claims that are made 
for each of these mechanisms. We argue that lack of effective formal channels for 
authorising representatives and holding them to account, undermines the substantive 
representative claims of these agents and agencies to `stand’ or `act’ for the European 
public. 
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EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE AND NMG 
Despite disagreement regarding the scope and nature of European governance, most 
analysts agree that at its heart lies the so called Community Method (CM). Majone has 
characterised this approach in normative terms as involving three constitutional principles 
- independence, sanctioning, and the offering of guarantees – to regulate the interaction 
between the main Union institutions. ‘Independence’ underlies the Commission’s 
exclusive prerogative to initiate proposals, execute policies, act as guardian of the 
Treaties, and represent the Community internationally. The Councils of Ministers and the 
European Parliament (EP) possess the power to ‘sanction’ the proposals made by the 
Commission. Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ‘guarantees’ a balance 
between the institutions, while upholding the integrity of the European legal system.
7
 
More descriptive accounts of the CM point to how various institutions have assumed 
particular responsibilities in relation to different areas of policy making. For instance, 
they distinguish between a stricter application of the CM with regard to areas such as 
agricultural and fishery policies, and slightly modified sets of rules of engagement and 
institutional responsibility in areas such as competition policy, regulation, and 
distributional issues.
8
 These descriptive accounts imply a greater role for social, sectoral, 
and regional actors, and in some cases for the mechanisms and logic of the market. 
 From an institutional perspective, the Commission provides the most innovative 
aspect of this structure of governance. Neither its bureaucratic nor its executive function 
operate on traditional lines, while its de facto veto power, deriving from its agenda-
setting prerogative and role as the guardian of the Treaties, lend it important legislative 
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and quasi-judicial functions. Majone suggests that the ‘organizing principle of the 
Community is not the separation of powers but the representation of (national and 
international) interests.’9 The interlocking of competences and the procedures followed in 
the decision-making process make the Commission a bearer of political interests, which 
are balanced with those represented by the other institutions comprising the CM. In 
Majone’s view, the CM offers a form of ‘mixed government’. However, as he also notes, 
this arrangement is characterized by the extensive delegation of powers from the member 
states (MS) to the Commission, which exercises the role of a supranational non-
majoritarian regulator.
10
 In this capacity, the Commission acts as the ‘agent’ for the MS. 
As we shall see, the centrality of this principal-agent relationship in the CM has important 
consequences for the conceptualization of the Commission’s representative function. 
Although the structure of EU governance is fairly innovative compared to 
decision-making processes within the MS, the CM retains certain traditional elements of 
governance: notably, a hierarchical division of competences, binding decisions, and the 
more or less uniform and strict implementation of rules through the use of sanctions for 
non compliers. However, alongside the CM, there have emerged other modes of 
governance aimed at policy coordination between different institutional and national 
actors, and forms of selective transgovernmental cooperation. As Scott and Trubeck note, 
these depart from both the CM and traditional governance in two important respects.
11
  
The first departure consists in a series of specific variations in how the CM 
operates, such as the introduction of more flexible and non-binding legislation and the 
substitution of procedural prescriptiveness for substantive uniformity. Other similar 
departures comprise the introduction in the policy-making process of new institutional 
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actors, in the form of comitology for instance, to partly direct and control the 
Commission;
12
 and the more frequent recourse to consultation with civil society 
organizations (CSOs) through ad hoc initiatives or more institutionalized fora and 
procedures.
13
 This kind of departure corrects and transforms the institutional equilibrium 
and competences of the CM, whilst giving greater leverage to national and sub-national 
actors in the implementation of policies and in the application of directives and other 
legislation, without changing the basic principles of traditional governance. Scott and 
Trubeck call this ‘new, old governance.’14 
The second kind of departure from the CM is presented as more radical, 
amounting to a wholesale alternative to traditional models of governance. As Citi and 
Rhodes argue, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) provides the most innovative of 
these new and alternative instruments.
15
 Scott and Trubeck list a series of characteristics 
that in their view sets NMG apart. These include: 
 the valorisation of forms of participatory governance involving CSOs;  
 the full acknowledgement of the multi-level nature of EU governance;  
 the recognition that legislation needs to adapt to diversity and subsidiarity;  
 the centrality of deliberation in policy making, both as an instrument for problem-
solving and as a form of legitimation;  
 the adoption of soft-law measures, and flexibility in implementation;  
 policy-making processes and mechanisms favouring experimentation and 
knowledge creation.
16
 
However, none of these characteristics is entirely new either. In one form or another, they 
have been integrated into traditional governance, be it as part of the process of policy 
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formulation, or as second-best options, or as a growing trend in international policy 
coordination.
17
 From this perspective, what distinguishes ‘new modes’ from ‘new, old 
governance’ is their more systematic application, with some claiming that they are 
embedded in a new architecture or ecology of European governance.
18
  
Whether we see NMG as supplementing or substituting for the older forms, with 
differences a matter of degree or kind, three core elements stand out. First, NMG is 
heterarchic. Second, it opts for soft-law and flexible instruments, embracing a weak 
conception of authority and uniformity in organization and policy-making. Finally, it 
privileges deliberative, consensus-based, and reciprocal learning forms of policy-making 
and problem-solving. It remains to be seen whether either the old governance of the CM, 
or these NMG can sustain forms of representation that go beyond those traditionally 
associated with standard democratic processes. 
 
REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS IN DELEGATION AND NMG 
To represent is either `to act for’ or `to stand in place of’ someone (or something) else. 
Representation involves a paradox: to make present what is absent.
19
 This paradox 
suggests that representing is a mental construction of a complex relationship in which 
both the means of representation and the nature of what is represented are continuously 
negotiated. This negotiation is particularly true of political representation, and especially 
of democratic politics, where representatives and represented tend to influence and 
reflexively re-define their respective roles, perceptions and behaviour. 
20
 
Political representation often gets equated with modern democracy and the ways 
the institutions of representative democracy translate the will (or preferences, depending 
 7 
on the approach) of the people into political decisions and action. However, as was 
evident from the tensions between elites and masses when representative democracies, 
first developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
21
 democratic representation 
does not exhaust political representation, or representation more broadly. With the spread 
of universal suffrage and the emergence of political parties, this tension has become less 
marked. Democracy and representation now appear as complementary and almost 
synonymous, rather than as alternative forms of government.
22
 Yet, that they need not 
coincide has become increasingly evident with the growth of informal and non-electoral 
forms of political representation.  
Analyses of representation in Europe usually focus on the more traditional forms 
of democratic and electoral representation, and concentrate on either the EP as the 
representative of the European citizens, or the Council as the indirect representative of 
the European peoples through their governments.
23
 However, these traditional forms of 
democratic legitimacy are supplemented by informal and semi-formal non-traditional 
forms of representation provided by the Commission and NMG. Moreover, it is these 
bodies that exercise the main executive and legislative functions of determining European 
policy. It is to the description and assessment of the degree to which these alternative 
types of representation can also lay claim to democratic legitimacy that we now turn. 
 
(a) Representation and delegation in the CM 
Although the CM employs the hierarchical and authoritative structures of decision-
making typical of ‘old’ modes of governance, it lacks the classical features of 
representative and democratic government found in national and federal states. As many 
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commentators have observed, neither the construct of ‘people’ nor that of ‘government’, 
both central to the idea of representative government, apply easily in the EU context. The 
existence and feasibility of a European Demos is famously contested,
24
 while what Hix 
calls the ‘double executive’ arrangement of the CM can hardly be described as a 
government in the traditional sense.
25
 We noted above how the EP and Council can claim 
to be respectively the direct and indirect representatives of European citizens and peoples 
and to have a responsibility towards their electorates and, in a loose sense, be held 
accountable for what they do. But, as we have also seen, the CM does not formally rest, 
as representative and democratic governments do, on its capacity to fulfil the mandate 
that comes through the formal channels of political representation. Though the Council 
and the EP can ‘sanction’ decisions taken at a European level, they have no monopoly 
over legislative and executive matters. Rather, it is the Commission – a non-elected and 
non-majoritarian institution – that plays the crucial role of initiating policy. Yet it lays 
claim to be representative in a different way in virtue of its ‘independent’ status.  
As already remarked, Majone has characterised the resulting institutional structure 
of EP, Council and Commission as a modern version of ‘mixed government’. The key 
aspect of this arrangement is that each of the three main institutions is ‘bearer of a 
particular interest that it strives to protect and promote’.26 Unlike the separation of 
powers, within ‘mixed government’ the separate institutions are politically and not 
merely functionally distinct: they are separate ‘political centres,’ and not separate 
‘organs’ of the state.27 They do not operate in distinct spheres of competence but rather 
co-operate in the decision-making process, bringing to the table different interests whose 
valence and relative force depends on the nature of the issues at stake.  
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At the core of the CM’s ‘mixed government’ is a basic ‘dualism’ of power 
between ‘the MS represented in the Council and the other European institutions.’ The 
Commission and the EP act as the ‘bearers’ of `supranational interests; but whereas the 
EP is elected by European citizens, and can claim to represent them and their ‘interests’ 
(at least formally) at the EU level, the Commission is not, nor is it accountable to the 
citizens directly – only very indirectly via the EP, which approves its members. If 
anything, the Commission is an ‘expression’ of the Council, and its composition reflects 
the composite nature of the EU as an organization of separate MS.
28
 Is there, therefore, 
another way in which the Commission can be said to ‘represent’ European supranational 
interests? We contend the Commission’s representative claim results from three separate 
processes, which can be categorized as ‘functional,’ ‘societal,’ and ‘delegative’ forms of 
representation, whose combination sets it aside from other European institutions. 
 Part of the Commission’s claim to represent European interests, and thereby 
justify its role as the formal agenda-setting institution, is its functional responsibility to 
act as the ‘guardian of the Treaties.’ This responsibility produces a norm-orientation to 
act ‘on behalf of the abstract “European interest” as defined in the Treaties.’29 Although 
the Commission is neither specifically nor personally accountable for the way in which it 
interprets this task; its position as a kind of ‘representative’ of the European interest is 
formally sanctioned by the EU Treaties, and the allocation of powers and responsibilities 
within the CM. The point is made explicitly in the White Paper on Governance, which 
describes the CM as providing two filters through which the policy-making process 
arbitrates between different interests. One filter is provided by ‘democratic 
representation’ via the Council and EP; the other is that of ‘the general interest at the 
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level of the Commission.’30 In this regard, the Commission’s role as a functional 
representative is not dissimilar to that attributed to national constitutional courts with 
respect to their constitutions; with the important difference that the Commission operates 
more directly as a political and policy-making actor, so there is no pretence of its 
operating as a purely judicial power.  
From another perspective, the functional representation claimed by the 
Commission approximates what Dryzek and Niemeyer have recently called ‘discursive 
representation.’ They argue that given no definite ontological ground exists to identify the 
precise entities deserving political representation, ‘discourses’ – as well as individuals, 
particular aspects of a person, or groups – can be legitimately represented politically. 
Indeed, they contend that discursive representation is particularly ‘feasible when the 
representation of persons is not so feasible (especially in transnational settings lacking a 
well-defined demos).’31  From this perspective, the Commission qua guarantor of the EU 
Treaties represents the discourse of European interests. Theoretically, this approach 
limits the degree the Commission can act as the bearer of the European interests to the 
way these are defined by the Treaties. In practice, though, that leaves ample latitude for 
the Commission to interpret Europe’s interests as it sees fit. The Commission de facto 
constitutes as well as represents the discourse of Europe’s interests by virtue of its power 
to promote policies at the European level. This blank claim to representation gives the 
Commission a privileged position, at least in principle, even if historically the political 
conditions in which the Commission operates drastically limit its ability to shape the 
European agenda and its capacity for autonomous action.
32
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 However, such functional representation is rather abstract, and provides the 
Commission with a weak and ill-defined basis for its claim to represent the general 
European interest. Moreover, the claim can appear self-serving, whilst its validity rests 
more on an `output’ rather than an `input’ perspective. As a result, the Commission has 
placed increasing emphasis on a second type of representative claim typically couched in 
the language of democratic ‘participation’. This second claim, perhaps best characterized 
as ‘societal representation,’ consists in the development of procedures and institutional 
settings for the consultation of CSOs and social partners as a more integral part of 
European governance. Such initiatives have long existed, going as far back, for example, 
as the network-building with social NGOs that the Commission promoted with the first 
anti-poverty programme of 1974.  But they were fore grounded in the ‘official’ discourse 
of the Commission and became more formalised with the White Paper on Governance 
and its commitment to create a ‘culture of consultation and dialogue.’33  
Rather than establishing legal rules and procedures, which risked slowing down 
considerably the process of policy-initiation and decision making, the White Paper 
suggested tightening-up standards for consultation, making it an essential part of the 
policy process with less ad hoc criteria and procedures for selecting and involving the 
relevant civil and social organizations. Additionally, the White Paper suggested these 
organizations be required to ‘tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of 
openness and representativity, and prove their capacity to relay information or lead 
debates in the MS.’34 This opening up was especially necessary in those key policy areas 
where there were already established histories and channels of consultation, for which the 
White Paper envisaged a structured dialogue through ‘partnership arrangements.’35  
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This new emphasis on civil society participation and consultation has been 
described as heralding a new ‘regime’ in European governance that introduces a 
‘participatory model’ alongside the established expert-based and partnership-based 
models.
36
 The attempt to increase civil society’s involvement in European governance 
also seeks to enhance the representativeness of the CSOs and the European institutions 
that consult them, above all the Commission. In the words of the White Paper, a more 
participatory and consultative regime will make the Commission ‘better placed to act in 
the general European interest’37 – not least because it can claim to have listened to a 
representative sample of relevant European opinion on the issues it tackles, thereby 
enhancing its standing vis-á-vis those EU institutions with an electoral mandate.  
The Commission has no common systematic consultation regime, with practices 
differing across policies and Directorates, although these differences can be justified as 
reflecting the nature of the policy good concerned and the type of group that needs to be 
consulted. While decision making remains technocratic, formal arrangements for 
involving social partners, such as the tripartite Advisory Council of representatives from 
governments, employers and unions used for occupational health and safety policy and 
consultations European Economic and Social Committee, have worked reasonably well.
38
 
However, the evidence is more mixed with regard to the broader consultation with civil 
society. The selection of CSOs  remains biased towards Brussels based ‘umbrella’ 
organisations, remote from the constituencies they purport to represent, while lobbying of 
the Commission favours  business and professional organisations over public interest 
groups by the order of 76% to 20%, and the older and larger over the newer and smaller 
MS.
39
 Moreover, CSOs are often financed by the EU and have typically been employed 
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by the Commission in the preparatory phases of policy making to legitimise the extension 
of its influence into areas with a weak or non-existent Treaty base.
40
 As recent studies 
have emphasised, the Commission manages lobbying by both firms and societal interest 
groups to create its own ‘insider’ organisations that foster trust between elite groups and 
Brussels officials and improve the flow of information from relevant parties to the 
Commission and the making of credible regulatory commitments, but also allow 
collusion with and capture by groups with the best organisational and resource 
advantages.
41
 Participation tends to be limited to the early stages of the policy process, 
continues to be through informal and semi-formal rather than formal channels, offers 
little scope for feedback,
42
 and excludes critical voices unwilling to exchange the 
possibility of initial consultation for subsequent passive compliance.
43
 
 Finally, the third sense in which the Commission aims to represent European-
wide interests derives from its character as a non-majoritarian, supranational regulatory 
agency to which extensive powers have been delegated. Although, conceptually, 
delegated and functional forms of representation are not neatly distinguishable, the way 
the Commission acts as a delegate is specific enough to be considered as separate 
category. Its role as a regulatory agent follows from the introduction of the Single 
European Act and the growth of its competences in the area of competition policy so as to 
facilitate the working of the single market.
44
 Using Franchino’s categories, one can locate 
the Commission at the receiving-end of two processes of delegation: one, which 
Franchino calls ‘Treaty delegation,’ that has the EU MS as the direct principals; the other, 
‘executive delegation’, that has the EU legislators, mainly the Council, but occasionally 
the EP, in the role of principal.
45
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Looked at in a stylized form, regulatory agencies can be considered as the 
‘representatives’ for the principals who select them, give them their regulatory powers, 
and may dismiss them. Indeed, the formal structure of representation, as identified by 
Pitkin, can be applied easily to delegation:  
A. Representation (delegation) involves a representative (agent) X being authorized 
by constituency (principal) Y to act with regard to good Z; 
B. Representation (delegation) involves a representative (agent) X being held 
accountable to constituency (principal) Y with regard to good Z.
46
 
From the perspective of principal-agent theory, democratic representation and regulatory 
delegation look rather similar, since they can both be nested in an overall chain of 
‘delegation of powers’ from citizens to non-majoritarian institutions, passing through 
legislative and executive bodies, and occasionally public bureaucracies.
47
 However, as 
the literature on regulatory delegation shows, at a more substantive level some of the 
operations, as well as the mechanisms of role-formation and agent’s motivation, are 
distinctive, following dynamics of their own, which are not entirely reducible to political, 
or even bureaucratic forms of representation.  
 Majone characterizes the reasons for delegation as being primarily of two kinds: 
the reduction of decision-making costs, and the enhancement of commitment and long-
term credibility. These two reasons align the principal’s and agent’s preferences in 
different ways to produce two divergent accounts of delegation.
48
 Delegating to reduce 
decision-making costs assumes that principal and agent share similar preferences. Indeed, 
the main problem for this kind of delegation is to ensure there are no ‘agency losses’. As 
a result, principals need to design selection procedures and post-delegation mechanisms 
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that avoid dangers such as ‘shirking’ (when agents follow their own preferences 
irrespective of their principals’), ‘slippage’ (perverse institutional mechanisms that make 
agents’ preferences diverge from their principals’), and ‘capture’ (when agents collude 
with the actors whose behaviour they are meant to regulate).
49
 This form of delegatory 
representation parallels that of mandated political representatives, for whom electoral 
mechanisms serve to guard against these risks. However, it is unclear that appointed, non-
majoritarian bodies have anything as effective as electoral accountability to keep them on 
their toes. Indeed, their main representative claim rests on the second reason which, by 
contrast, requires that delegates be insulated against the need for undue responsiveness to 
their principals’ preferences. 
 The rationale for delegation to guarantee market credibility and maintain 
commitments assumes principals suffer from akrasia and act for short-term personal 
advantages at the expense of long-term collective benefits, even if they ultimately stand 
to gain from them. Principals can avoid this dilemma by adopting a pre-commitment 
strategy, and selecting agents whose incentive structure coincides with the long-term 
commitments required by markets rather than the short-term popularity politicians 
typically need to court. One consequence of this de-alignment of preferences between 
principal and agent is to increase agents’ discretion and relax considerably, if not 
completely, the accountability and control conditions to which they are subjected. Agents 
no longer ‘represent’ their principals own short term understanding of their interests and 
preferences, but rather respond to their principals’ supposed second order preference. 
This involves their agents acting according to their own ‘independent’ judgement as to 
where their principals’ first order interests and preferences lie in the long term so as to 
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produce the commitment and credibility required by the market. Thus, when the 
Commission acts as a non-majoritarian regulatory agent of the European market, it does 
not directly represent the MS (as in Treaty delegation) or the EU legislative bodies (as in 
executive delegation), but rather ‘represents’ the long-term interests of the European 
Union and its MS, even if its reading of these interests and preferences diverges from 
how the other institutional actors perceive them.  
 The implicit view of the Commission’s representative role within this 
conceptualization of delegation reinforces other characteristics of how non-majoritarian 
regulators operate. These features proceed from the way these institutions have emerged 
as distinct and semi-autonomous actors from governments. Many have developed what 
Coen and Thatcher call ‘relational distance,’ with their own modus operandi and internal 
and self-referential organization.
50
 Thus, the European Commission ‘has created its own 
network of national competition regulators’, thereby moving delegation further along the 
line, and making the decisions of these regulators even more distant from their principals. 
Moreover, the delegation of power to non-majoritarian regulators works as a kind of 
incomplete contract.
51
 For, the kind of actions and intervention they may need to 
undertake cannot be fully predicted when power gets delegated, creating a considerable 
area for them to exercise their discretion in potentially arbitrary ways. 
 The account of representation implied by the Commission’s activity as a 
delegated regulator in this second sense is that of ‘trusteeship.’ As Majone observes, it 
acts as a ‘fiduciary.’52 This fiduciary role is further reinforced by the functional and 
societal modalities of representation discussed above. Acting in each of these modalities, 
the Commission claims autonomously to interpret and express the European public 
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interest. It does so in accordance with the various tasks it performs within the CM: as the 
guarantor of the Treaties, as the mediator with CSOs of European society’s interests, and 
as an expert-based, non-majoritarian regulatory institution. However, as we shall see in 
the next section, it remains unclear on what basis the Commission can claim to be 
actually representing Europe and European-wide interests, and whether the mechanisms 
through which the Commission interprets the public interest are effective and have 
democratic legitimacy. For, though Burke famously championed trusteeship as the prime 
responsibility of political representatives, it has generally come to be seen as at odds with 
their democratic status as elected servants of the popular mandate.
53
  
 
(b) Representation in the NMG 
Most of the representative claims made in support of NMG parallel those invoked for the 
Commission. Indeed, the three modalities of representation – functional, societal, and 
delegative –apply here too. We shall start by briefly examining delegative representation 
since it operates on the same principles, and through very similar mechanisms to those 
described for the Commission. We shall then explore the more distinctive forms societal 
and functional representation take in this case. 
 Once again, the delegative modality of representation follows from the delegation 
of regulatory tasks to independent and non-majoritarian agencies, whose main task is 
creating markets or correcting their behaviour. Much of the discussion of the fiduciary 
role played by the Commission can therefore be transposed to NMG more broadly. 
However, in this case the principal is often the Commission, which, as we have seen, acts 
in its turn as the agent for other principals. Consequently, with NMG the chain of 
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delegation gets extended even further, increasing the scope for private organizations and 
self-regulation and widening the ‘relational distance’ identified by Coen and Thatcher as 
one of the ways in which regulatory agents acquire more autonomy and discretion in the 
decision making process.
54
 Most importantly, regulation is seen from a sectoral 
perspective, and so is more dispersed and self-referential. 
 A similar process of diffusion and segmentation applies to the societal modality of 
representation. Societal representation by CSOs has two rationales within European 
governance. The first is to provide one of the preconditions for political 
representativeness by constructing a ‘social constituency’ for the European polity in 
formation.
55
 It offers a social point of reference for a political system whose links with 
European citizens are tenuous at best. Kohler-Koch calls this process an exercise in 
‘imaginary representation,’ and considers it a ‘category that is supposed to help 
understand the formation of a “political system” and not to assess the democratic 
functioning of the EU.’56 The second rationale for societal representation is linked to a 
conception of participatory governance, whereby policies are said to be more responsive 
and more likely to be regarded as legitimate through involving those affected in making 
them.  
Both these rationales risks subsuming the European public as a whole into the 
plethora of civil and social interest-based organizations that EU institutions choose to 
consult. Nevertheless, we saw how within the CM, the Commission plays a mediatory 
and filtering role that – however imperfectly and self-serving in nature – at least attempts 
to give some unity to the variety of concerns expressed by different autonomous forms of 
social organization. It seeks to reconcile different interests and in various ways synthesise 
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them so as to express an overarching European interest. By contrast, within NMG the 
representation of social interests and particular concerns is often even more haphazard. 
Different bodies and countries offer different degrees of access, participation tends to be 
informal and, as is invariably true within the CM, restricted to preliminary consultations. 
At the EU level, only those groups who can afford to be in Brussels are involved, 
political parties are excluded, and, as in the CM, experts and technocrats are favoured – 
especially in comitology, with only MS representatives and the Commission having 
formal participation rights on the relevant policy-making bodies.
57
 Indeed, in some cases 
NMG arrangements for involving social partners and stakeholders have merely detracted 
from more inclusive mechanisms established within CM.
58
 As a result, NMG threaten to 
be still more partial and arbitrary in their representativeness of civil society as a whole.  
In fact, the participation of stakeholders and the organizations of affected parties 
in NMG is usually justified less on the grounds that they give access to more groups and 
hence are more representative per se, and more because they are thought to produce 
better decision making in a specific sector or activity. However, such partial involvement, 
and the fact that it is largely consultative, means that at best it gives these decisions a 
spurious legitimacy, at worst it fails to assess the impact of policies in a given sector on 
social interests not directly relevant to its operations or their relative importance 
compared to measures in other sectors. In this respect, societal representation merges into 
the functional modality of representation. As we noted, the main features of NMG are 
said to lie in their offering a heterarchical structure of authority, greater flexibility, and 
enhanced problem-solving capacity. These qualities supposedly produce a more 
deliberative decision-making process aimed at achieving consensus on the best policy 
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rather than bargaining to reconcile competing interests, while nevertheless remaining 
attuned to the diversity and multi-level nature of the EU. By bringing together state and 
non-state actors, experts and social representatives in a forum orientated towards the 
sharing of knowledge, mechanisms such as the OMC and network governance are held to 
foster ‘a reasoned discourse between expert and lay people’59 that overcomes a ‘deficit of 
mutual awareness between civil society and public authorities.’60 Strategies such as 
benchmarking and peer review supposedly encourage those involved to adopt the better 
rather than merely convenient or self-serving practices, while respecting relevant and 
legitimate differences stemming from the autonomy and distinctiveness of the MS.
61
  
However, one can just as easily imagine these structural constraints having 
precisely the opposite effect – of producing only mutually advantageous, Pareto-optimal 
improvements that benefit those already privileged within the status quo by leaving 
existing inequities and inefficiencies intact. Fair and equitable policies will only emerge 
from this process if the representation is itself fair and equitable between the main 
concerns that need to be aired, or if the representatives see themselves as serving public 
rather than sectional interests. Yet, few if any criteria exist to ensure that representation 
fulfils the requisite standards of either fairness or publicness. It might be argued that 
when dealing with the largely technical questions that form the bulk of the EU’s business 
both can be met through appointing national experts. However, not only can experts often 
disagree on technicalities, but also most technical questions have broader social and 
economic effects. Again, such policy spill-overs may go unaddressed without fair 
representation of non technical parties from both within and, as we noted above, outside 
the sector. Health and safety standards for food produce, for example, will have 
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implications for a whole range of actors and policy areas - affecting the viability of 
different kinds of farming practice, consumer choice, regional development, 
environmental policies and so on. Quite how all these might be appropriately factored 
into the deliberative process to ensure all receive their due weighting within the 
discussion remains obscure. Indeed, the evidence thus far suggests little deliberation 
occurs within the NMG, be it due to time constraints, the absence of a plurality of actors, 
or a lack of commitment on the part of those involved.
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As with the CM, the claim that NMG represent the European public interest 
appears more rhetorical than real. Moreover, with NMG this problem gets exacerbated by 
the fragmented and partial way social interests are represented. But the main issue 
concerning both modes of governance is whether, conceptually and normatively, clear 
mechanisms could be said to exist for ensuring that political representation occurs.  
 
CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS 
Following Pitkin,
63
 one can distinguish formal from substantive concepts of 
representation. Formal understandings contain two key elements, though different 
theories may focus more on one or the other: namely, authorization and accountability. 
These provide the formal processes through which representation takes place. We 
referred to these formal structures above in noting how representation consists in X 
authorizing Y (with regard to Z), and, at the same time, X being accountable to Y (with 
regard to Z). By contrast, substantive understandings concern the way in which the 
representative relationship works. Pitkin suggests that, broadly speaking, substantive 
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concepts view representation as a way of either ‘standing for’ or ‘acting for’ someone or 
something else.  
‘Standing for’ suggests a somewhat passive way of taking someone’s place and 
‘acting for’ a more independent way of doing so. However, such a sharp distinction 
would be overdrawn. Representatives who ‘stand for’ others may be obliged to act in a 
way that reflects their principals’ preferences or spirit but they rarely have a precise 
imperative mandate from them detailing how they should act on all occasions. Thus, 
‘standing for,’ which can take descriptive or symbolic forms, allows representatives some 
lee-way for interpreting their role and a degree of independence in how they perform it. 
However, overall the idea of ‘standing for’ sees representation as involving either a 
correspondence of interests and views between the representative and those he or she 
represents , or a mirroring or reflection of those being represented in those that represent 
them, for example in their sharing a given quality such as gender or colour.  
By contrast, ‘acting for’ focuses on the substance of the activity performed by the 
representative. As Pitkin says, ‘we are now interested in the nature of the activity itself, 
what goes on during representing, the substance or content of acting for others, as distinct 
from its external and formal trappings’.64 Nevertheless, there is a range of ways of ‘acting 
for’ another person: be it as a substitute, a trustee, a deputed agent, a fiduciary, or an 
expert. As we shall see below, each of these ways of ‘acting for’ involves a different view 
of the relationship between the representative and the represented. Whereas some ways 
come close to the ‘standing for’ model, whereby an agent acts as their principals could be 
expected to, had they the ability or standing to do so; other ways involve agents acting for 
the benefit of their principals, even if their view of what would most benefit them 
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conflicts with their principals own reading of their best interests. However, all these cases 
differ from the ‘standing for’ model in involving some weaker or stronger sense in which 
representatives exercise their own judgement as to what is necessary to secure the best 
outcome for the represented, be that a view or knowledge of the most appropriate means, 
or in the strongest case, of what the better outcome would be. 
 Analysing the representative claims of the Commission and NMG through 
Pitkin’s grid, it is clear that they emphasise the substantive over the formal aspects of 
representation. At most, particularly in the case of the Commission, their claims resemble 
those made by traditional structures of bureaucratic representation, whose 
representativeness in terms of authorization and accountability is nested within a more 
general structure of political and democratic representation involving some appeal to the 
electorate and public opinion more broadly. However, in the European case these appeals 
are extremely tenuous, because the chain between the general public and those who make 
decisions is such a long one. For example, the Commission may be appointed by the MS 
and subject to approval by the EP, but once in office they operate with a high degree of 
independence. Likewise, the delegated representatives in regulatory and other non-
majoritarian bodies tend to be ‘authorised’ by governments or the Commission whose 
own formal authorisation by, and accountability to, a European public is rather thin. 
Moreover, they then enjoy considerable discretion in view of their role as either experts 
or credible agents. Indeed, their credibility is often held to depend on criteria not only 
external to but deliberately insulated from any need to reflect or be accountable to the 
declared preferences of those they represent. 
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 The representative claims of European governance are therefore mainly based on 
the substantive understandings of representation. What we termed the ‘societal’ modality 
of representation gestures towards the ‘standing for’ conception. As we saw, civil society 
organisations are treated as reflecting the diversity of European society at large. But in 
the absence of systematic formal mechanisms of authorisation and accountability, such 
claims are more symbolic than descriptive. Whereas elections give all voters the 
opportunity to express their views on a range of policies on an equal basis, with majority 
voting in the context of a system of competing parties offering a fair means for 
aggregating their different preference schedules in a way that packages them so as to 
roughly reflect the preference schedule of the electorate,
65
 no equivalent mechanisms 
exist to ensure that consultations with civil society fairly describe the balance of social 
views overall. Instead, there is a real danger that this system will overly respond to those 
with the organisational resources and commitment to gain access. In practice, civil 
society representatives no less than functional and delegated representatives end up 
making their representative claims on the grounds that they ‘act for’ a European society 
that has yet to develop the capacity to represent itself. 
As Pitkin observed, the ‘acting for’ conception poses two main problems.66 The 
first is the conceptual problem of whether we can have representation without formal 
authorization and accountability – how can we know that such a person is truly acting as 
a representative? The second is the normative problem of whether any independent 
purely substantive criteria exist that can enable us to ascertain what it means to act for the 
good of someone else (or, in our case, in the public interest)  
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The conceptual problem arises because ‘substantive acting for others,’ as Pitkin 
puts it, takes many different forms, not all of which can be categorized clearly as a form 
of representation. Pitkin distinguishes five major forms,
67
 which we list here in 
descending order, from the weakest, which require a stricter adherence to the instructions 
of the represented, to the strongest, which give considerable autonomy to the person who 
acts.  
1. Those forms that refer to ‘acting for’ as the act of someone who is sent or 
delegated to do something specific (an ambassador, for instance); 
2. those forms that refer to ‘acting for’ as a kind of ‘substitution’ (an attorney or 
someone acting in a vicarious way); 
3. those forms that refer to ‘acting for’ as the action of an agent, who can, however, 
be considered as a ‘mere’ agent, or as a ‘free’ agent (this ambiguity is typical of 
the role played by elected representatives, even though Pitkin emphasizes that an 
important distinction remains between an ‘agent’ and a ‘representative’, a point to 
which we return); 
4. those forms that refer to ‘acting for’ in the sense of taking care, or ‘acting in the 
interests’ of someone (a trustee and a guardian are the most common examples) ; 
5. and those forms associated with the idea that experts and professionals are acting 
in the interest of others (a physician, for instance). 
These five forms cover a semantic field according to which we can interpret ‘acting for’ 
in the two polar senses of either acting ‘instead of’ (mainly forms 1 and 2), or acting ‘to 
the benefit of’ (forms 4 and 5), with form (3) nicely poised in the middle, since it can be 
interpreted in either sense. For Pitkin, this ambiguity applies more generally to the very 
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activity of representation.
68
 But looking at these different forms within the context of our 
discussion of European governance, we can confidently assert that both the Commission 
and the various instruments of NMG are closest to the strongest forms (3) to (5). The 
implication is that their role as ‘representatives’ is mainly a function of their actions and 
decisions being beneficial to the European public, rather than expressing the public.  
As Pitkin notes, it is unclear in what sense these latter claims are representative 
claims at all. What these strong senses of ‘acting for’ lack is the idea, central in political 
representation, that the represented is present (hence also responsible) in the action of 
their representatives. Pitkin distinguishes between a ‘representative’ and an ‘agent.’69 The 
latter ‘does the actual work’ for someone else, so is a kind of tool or instrument; while the 
former is not a simple instrument, because he or she acts as if they were that person. The 
‘presence’ of the represented in the action of the representative can only be understood if 
we take the substantive aspect of the idea of representation (‘acting for’ or ‘standing for’) 
in conjunction with the formal aspects of authorization and accountability. But, as we 
have seen, these formal aspects are lacking in NMG, and this weakens the sense in which 
we can say that they represent the European public. The suspicion arises that they merely 
represent their own view of what a European public would want. Yet such a public may 
not exist – it could be entirely ‘imagined’. 
The normative problem enters here. For their own view need not reflect their own 
self-interest. It may represent a correct view of the interests of those they ‘act for’. The 
difficulty is how can we know whether this is the case or not? Again, formal mechanisms 
of authorisation and accountability seem necessary. These exist for physicians and 
lawyers, say. There are professional standards that they have to meet, and bodies that 
 27 
authorise that they have met them and to whom they are accountable for continuing to do 
so. As a result, one can at least say they are agents qualified to act for others in pursuance 
of a given task. It is unclear anything similar exists for political representatives other than 
a democratic process. As we saw, it was claimed that NMG offer a process of public 
reasoning, yet we observed how the structural constraints in themselves were unlikely to 
produce such a result unless there was a fair representation of the public involved. No 
metric for ensuring reasons do reflect the public interest exists beyond their exposure to 
public challenge. Likewise, the qualities needed to represent the public lie in large part in 
the ability to take the public with you. The selection and sanctioning processes of 
elections serve both these purposes. Of course, the stronger senses of ‘acting for’ suggest 
that their principals lack the ability to see their own interests for themselves. By analogy, 
these cases suggest we should view the European public as too immature, irrational, or 
ignorant to perceive where their own interests lie – a somewhat paradoxical basis for 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that EU governance makes representative claims of a functional, 
delegative and societal nature.
70
 However, these claims are of a substantive kind to 
‘stand’ or ‘act’ for a European public. The formal mechanisms that might allow this 
putative public to ‘authorise’ these claims and hold those who make them to ‘account’ are 
residual and imperfect at best. Yet without such formal mechanisms it is unclear whether 
these claims can be regarded as representative in any meaningful sense. No European 
public is ‘present’ within the activities of their putative agents. We have only hinted at 
 28 
the likely consequences of such attempts to separate ‘substantive’ from ‘formal’ 
representation. However, a potential danger exists that those interests that are represented 
are so partial – being either expert or bureaucratic delegates easily captured by the 
governmental or commercial interests they are supposed to control, or CSOs that are the 
creatures of those who not only consult with, but largely finance them – that this system 
risks magnifying the disadvantages of pork barrel, pressure group politics often 
associated with conventional democracy, without the benefits of its compensating 
advantages of promoting political equality and responsiveness.
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